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In Maine, we have the amazing power as young people to make a difference. It is
as easy to run into my state representatives in the supermarket or the local coffee shop,
Jorgenson’s, as it is to meet with them at their local office or at the State House in
Augusta. I can join a signature gathering campaign sponsored by local college students
and I can help count absentee ballots with senior citizens on Election Day. Here in
Waterville, politics are accessible. I believe that my opinion counts not only when I vote,
but every time I decide to voice my beliefs.
When I told friends from home that I had decided to leave Brooklyn and go to
Maine for college, they called me crazy. To city slickers, it’s considered sacrilege to
leave New York, but it was even worse to move to the antithesis of the Big Apple: The
Country. Besides the snow and subzero temperatures, what was I going to do with my
time? “Believe me,” I told them, “I always find something to do.” Did I ever.
Before entering Colby, I had heard about The League of Pissed-Off Voters from
various progressive listserves. Now known nationally as The League of Young Voters,
their goal is to build a national youth-driven organization dedicated to framing politics in
a way that appeals to young people. Using tools such as hip-hop and art, they work to
engage 18-35 year olds in the political process. When I arrived at the Colby Activities
Fair and heard a fellow New Yorker pumping The Clash from his boom box and talking
about voting and political awareness, I knew I had found my “something to do.”
In the autumn of 2005, I became Co-President of the group and dove head-first
into my first experience with direct democracy: I campaigned against a law that would
repeal civil rights for homosexuals in Maine. The Colby League joined the statewide
progressive coalition, Maine Won’t Discriminate, to defeat Question 1 by 55%. It was a
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close call and we stayed up until 3 am waiting for the results. I can remember just how
thrilled I was to know that all the hard work and dedication that I contributed (including
the 400+ Colby students we drove to the polls) had truly made a difference. Since Maine
Won’t Discriminate, I have worked on many other candidate and ballot measure
campaigns and each time the thrill is just the same because I know we’re building a better
Maine. I really couldn’t be happier that I decided to go to college in a state where there is
direct democracy.
One of the most important lessons I’ve learned is the power of coalition building.
I think that each campaign has been successful because of groups of like-minded people:
old and young, unions and local businesses, environmentalists, and religious groups. Had
these groups rejected alliances, they would not have successfully conveyed their message
to Maine voters. I have been thoroughly impressed by the message-framing and eventplanning of each coalition and glad to do my part as a young, civically engaged Mainer (I
even have the Maine ID to prove it!).
Ballot initiatives have been my passion since arriving at Colby and when
considering thesis topics, I realized that I want to be an expert. I decided to do an indepth study of the effects of progressive coalitions on ballot initiatives. Before
researching this topic, I assumed that progressive coalitions do, in fact, have a positive
effect on ballot campaigns and that the creation of such alliances could drastically change
the outcome of an election. In beginning my research, I wanted to address three
questions: Who is included in these coalitions? What messages do coalitions use to
convince voters to support or oppose initiatives and referenda? And do funds determine
victory? I believe that the most successful ballot measure campaigns incorporate a strong,
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framed message, the participation of diverse progressive organizations, and a sizable
budget. Most importantly, I will prove that coalitions using grassroots organizing are
particularly successful.1
This work is particularly exciting because political scientists have done very little
research about the contemporary use of the ballot initiative. Because I could not elaborate
on the work of others, I decided to start by researching the history of the process and
completing three case studies to recognize trends and strategies in ballot initiative
campaigns. My case studies include one proposed conservative measure defeated by a
progressive coalition; one passed progressive measure supported by a progressive
coalition; and one failed progressive measure.
My paper consists of three sections. In the first, I explain the function of ballot
measures and discuss why Americans have supported or opposed the use of direct
democracy. I will also offer the history of direct democracy. In the second section, I will
discuss the current national state of affairs in direct democracy, specifically analyzing
recent ballot measures. I will analyze three cases, focusing on information gathered from
the news media and personal interviews with campaign organizers. Finally, I will draw
conclusions about these three measures and assert implications for the future of direct
democracy.

1

“Grassroots” refers to political activism that starts at the citizen level. This often occurs when a
community unites around a local issue. Grassroots organizing is not initiated by the state in any way.
Volunteers work with people in their community to spread their message and attain political goals.
Historically, grassroots work has focused on voter education and registration, commonly known as “get out
the vote.” Other examples of grassroots work include organizing house parties, putting up posters,
gathering signatures for a petition or an initiative, organizing demonstrations, or raising small amounts of
money for political groups or candidates.
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Chapter 1: Process and History
The Ins and Outs of Direct Democracy
Direct democracy is a form of citizen participation whereby constituents, rather than
elected representatives, make legislative and bureaucratic decisions by ballot. Direct
democracy exists in countries around the world including Israel, Italy, New Zealand,
Spain, and Sweden.2 Current systems of direct democracy are modeled after the Swiss
form, the first process enacted. The “Optional Referendum” spread widely throughout
Swiss canton governments in the early 1800s and the federal government adopted the
process in 1874, calling it “The Veto.”3 Eighteenth-century Progressives in the United
States modeled American direct democracy on this early Swiss practice. In the United
States today, there are two prominent forms of citizen participation: the ballot initiative
and the popular referendum.
An American ballot initiative, or citizen’s initiative, is a piece of legislation supported
by petition by registered voters, which can place the proposed law on the ballot. The
petition can be a statute, constitutional amendment, or statement for a legislative body to
consider. A statute and constitutional amendment differ in that a state legislative body
can more easily overturn a statute than an amendment. To place a question on the ballot,
citizen groups must collect thousands of signatures of support from registered voters. The
number of signatures varies by state and each year the secretary of state’s office
determines the required number by an equation that often involves the total number of
votes cast in a prior gubernatorial election. In Maine, for example, this number is
calculated, as per the state constitution, as ten percent of the total votes cast in the most
2

Centre for Research on Direct Democracy, “Direct Democracy,” http://www.c2d.ch.
Ewin M. Bacon and Morrill Wyman, Direct Elections and Law-Making by Popular Vote (Cambridge:
The Riverside Press, 1912), 15-6.
3
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recent gubernatorial race.4
Many times community organizations will form a coalition to work on a ballot
initiative, to garner support or organize opposition to a measure. In the 2006 Arizona
election, citizens proposed and passed Proposition 201, a ballot initiative to prohibit
smoking in many public places and to increase the tax on cigarettes. The “Smoke-Free
Arizona Act” was supported by a coalition of more than 100 community, health, and
business organizations including the American Cancer Society, American Heart
Association, and American Lung Association.5
The second form of direct democracy is the popular referendum. This is a direct vote
in which a legislative body asks its constituents to approve or reject a proposal. This
process includes the adoption of a new law, constitution, or constitutional amendment. In
November 2008, the State Legislature of Oregon will ask voters to decide whether or not
they want to allow same-sex domestic partnerships. In place of a citizens’ group, the
House Committee on Elections, Ethics, and Rules proposed the bill, HB 2007.6 A
referendum can even propose the recall of an elected official, which happened to
California Governor Gray Davis in 2003. Although voters elected Davis to a second term
as Governor in 2002, constituent anger arose about a failing California economy, a
budget shortfall of $38 billion, and Davis’ alleged mishandling of California’s 2000
electricity crisis.7 On October 7, 2003, California voters recalled Davis with 55.4% of the

4

State Bureau of Corporations, Elections & Commissions, “Deadlines for Current Citizen Initiatives,”
Maine Secretary of State, http://www.maine.gov/sos/ cec/elec/pets02/pets02de.htm.
5
Arizona Secretary of State, “2006 Ballot Propositions,” http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/Info/
PubPamphlet/english/Prop201.htm.
6
74th Oregon Legislative Assembly. “Enrolled House Bill 2007,” http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/
irr/2008/303text.pdf.
7
Inside Politics, “Davis: A Shining Resume, A Resounding Defeat,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/
2003/ALL POLITICS/10/07/davis.bio/.
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votes in favor of the recall, and later replaced him with Arnold Schwarzenegger.8
Proponents believe that without direct democracy, elected officials have too much
power. They think that by proposing ballot measures, citizens are given the opportunity
to make policy in their communities that politicians might otherwise be unwilling to
address. Often an issue will divide the constituency of an elected official and that
politician may avoid addressing the subject in fear of losing support. Due to direct
democracy, a citizen can propose an initiative to create change, even if their opinion is in
the minority. In 2006, this occurred in Massachusetts, when voters passed a nonbinding
ballot measure that called on President George W. Bush and the United States Congress
to end the war in Iraq and immediately bring the troops home. A nonbinding resolution
does not enact legislation or force representatives to take action, and although the
measure did not make substantive change, it allowed constituents to send a message to
their elected officials. Paul Shannon, employed by the American Friends Service
Committee to coordinate the effort, said that the bill was important because even though
the majority of Massachusetts residents oppose the war, the media does not recognize that
belief because pundits refuse to address the issue.9 Ballot initiatives have the potential
make governments accountable to their citizens because measures force politicians to
comment on important issues.
Many political scientists assent that direct democracy encourages open and
educated discourse among voters and increases voter turnout. As Caroline Tolbert writes,
when proponents of direct democracy believe that when faced by important policy issues,
“[voters will] begin to assume the stature of a man, to become a sovereign in fact as well
8

"California Gov. Gray Davis' Legacy." All Things Considered. National Public Radio. 16 Nov. 2003.
David Abel and Jonathan Saltzman, “Iraq Pullout Resolution on Ballot,” Boston Globe, October 11, 2006,
A1.
9
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as in fancy.”10 Regrettably an overwhelming amount of media coverage and
advertisements in presidential election years discourage voters from the polls because
they do not feel as knowledgeable enough about the issues and/or candidates. As a result,
turnout decreases. However, decreased information saturation in mid-year elections,
promotes higher voter turnout. Decreased information most often does not eliminate
advertising and door-knocking, bur rather the amount of campaigning becomes
manageable and voters feel capable of making an informed decision.
Although too much information can overwhelm voters, studies prove that
initiatives can increase voter turnout. When initiatives are consistently on the ballot,
voters become increasingly aware of and comfortable with the process. Political scientist
Caroline Tolbert confirmed that the presence and frequency of ballot initiatives increase
the number of voters. In fact, her study revealed that each question on the ballot increases
the likelihood that a citizen will turn out by one percent.11 States with multiple ballot
initiatives have roughly a four percent turnout increase in presidential elections and
roughly eight percent in midterm elections.12 Proponents contend that ballot measures are
necessary because they empower a greater number of citizens.
Critics of initiatives and referenda believe that the process affords too much
power to an undereducated public. Political scientist Robert M. Alexander writes that
opponents worry that “[voters] may be led astray by slick advertisements or bumper
stickers.”13 Concerned pundits claim that it is not constituents, but special interest groups,

10

Caroline J. Tolbert et al., “Enhancing Civic Engagement,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 3 (2003):
27.
11
Ibid., 34.
12
Ibid., 25.
13
Robert M. Alexander, Rolling the Dice with State Initiatives: Interest Group Involvement in Ballot
Campaigns (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 3.
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that propose legislation. For example, out of state interest groups often support the issue
of regulatory takings, which allows the government to regulate zoning laws to such an
extreme that the state essentially exercises eminent domain without divesting the
property’s owner from the title to their land. The burden of proof then falls onto the
property owner to prove to a court that the land has lost all economic value. This has been
especially appealing to business owners that convince state agencies to rezone residential
and environmentally protected areas. In Idaho in 2006, the group This House is My
Home proposed a regulatory takings measure and received financial backing from Fund
for Democracy, a New York special interest group. Five months before the election, Fund
for Democracy had already raised $237,000 in support of Proposition 2. The progressive
coalition Neighbors Protecting Idaho who convinced 76% of voters to resoundingly reject
Proposition 2 had to fight an organization with out-of-state funds, which made their work
more difficult.14 This House is My Home touted big city donors such as Americans for
Limited Government and Premiere Merchant Services, whereas Neighbors Protecting
Idaho raised money locally from in-state organizations such as Idaho Power and the
Conservation Voters for Idaho.15 Due to the fact that Neighbors Protecting Idaho was an
in-state coalition, which means that they had the power to campaign locally, convincing
their friends and neighbors that Proposition 2 was a bad idea for Idaho.
Adversaries of ballot measures also worry that citizen groups will have too great
an influence on voting choices. These groups include business and economic groups,
trade unions, and spiritual institutions. The sway of such organizations has been noticed
in the past five years by political pundits, as many religious leaders have preached against
14

Elections, Campaign Disclosure and Lobbyists, “November 7, 2006 General Election Results:Statewide
Totals,” Idaho Secretary of State, http://www.idsos.state.id.us/elect/RESULTS/2006/general/tot_stwd.htm.
15
Ibid.
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stem cell research ballot initiatives, urging their parishioners to vote their religious
conscience. Father Frank Pavone writes in his voter guide that it is impossible to separate
church and state when voting: “It is about the kind of authority government has. It is
about who is ultimately in charge, God or government? It’s about the most fundamental
political question there can be.”16 Opponents of ballot initiatives worry that voters trust
these organizations to inform their vote, giving citizen groups too much sway over public
opinion.
Ironically, it was such a fear of the power of the few that began a strong direct
democracy movement during the Progressive Era. But this is not where the story of ballot
measures begins; that story begins before the United States was even a nation.

16

Father Frank Pavone, “Ten Easy Steps To… Voting With a Clear Conscience,” Priests for Life,
http://www.priestsforlife.org/vote/votingwithclearconscience.htm#weigh.
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The History of Direct Democracy
In order to fully appreciate the current state of direct democracy, it is important to
understand the history of the practice. It is necessary to understand the causalities of
traditions and procedure. In this section, I will discuss the inception and proliferation of
direct democracy. I will speak specifically to historical subject trends and contextualize
my case studies in contemporary political issue movements.
Since the inception of direct democracy, it has been a popular form of political
involvement in the United States. In fact, Thomas Jefferson was a strong advocate and
proposed direct democracy even before the thirteen colonies formed a country. He once
said, “The further the departure from direct and constant control by the citizens, the less
has the government the ingredient of republicanism.”17 He believed that without
consistent citizen input, American leadership would deteriorate. In 1775, he proposed that
the Virginia State Constitution should be approved by a statewide referendum.18 This
motion was not ratified because Jefferson was at the Continental Congress and his letter
arrived too late to be considered, but it was the beginning of a movement that is still
vibrant today.
Citizens first demanded the power of direct democracy as new states ratified their
constitutions in the early 1800s. In fact, by 1835, eleven states had endorsed their
constitutions by direct democracy, which compelled Congress to dictate in 1857 that
thenceforth each new state would approve their constitution by popular referendum.19
The opinion of the states influencing decision-making at the federal level embodies the

17

The Initiative and Referendum Institute, “History of the Initiative Process,” University of Southern
California, http://www.iandrinstitute.com.
18
Ibid.
19
The Initiative and Referendum Institute.
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spirit of direct democracy— citizens had an avenue to participate directly in the
management of their country. However, it must be noted that not all citizens that could
vote. It was, in fact, the common white man, who could vote. At this time, women and
non-whites were not included in the voting population.
Direct democracy in the United States developed further in the late1800s when the
ideology of populism became prevalent. Populism is an egalitarian philosophy that
supports empowering the common man in his struggle against the privileged elite.20 The
political action surrounding this philosophy emerged in the 1890s, but 1885 marked the
first step in this movement. It was in 1885 that citizens first demanded an initiative and
referendum process, supporting the rights of the common citizen to create legislation.
Direct democracy embodies the spirit of populism because it gives citizens— the
common people— the right to actively take part in their government. Populism was an
especially popular idea in the Western and Midwestern states where residents valued the
right of the individual and it was for this reason that Father Robert Haire, an abolitionist
and labor activist, and newspaper publisher Benjamin Urner became the first Americans
to recommend statewide initiative and referendum power. It was in part due to Haire’s
and Urner’s work convincing many candidates in South Dakota to run on a platform of
direct democracy that South Dakota became the first state to adopt initiative and popular
referendum when the Populist Party took control of the state government in 1897.21 Most
of the states that adopted direct democracy laws were in the Midwestern and Western
United States. In the period between 1897 and 1918, twenty-three states adopted
statewide initiative and/or the people’s referendum. Among these states was Oregon,
20

Robert C. McMath, Jr., American Populism: A Social History 1877-1898 (New York: Hill and Want,
1993), 51.
21
Patrick Gallagher, “The Father of Direct Democracy,” National Catholic Reporter, August 11, 2006.
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which in 1904 was the first state to put an initiative on the ballot. The most divisive issue
of the time and thus, the first ballot question, was prohibition.22
Although the Populist movement was strong in the western United States, social
power struggles fueled resistance to the movement in the rest of the country. In eastern
port states, concern existed among long-time natives that if measures were placed on the
ballot, immigrants would be able to gain political clout. In the South, racism against
African Americans strongly influenced the anti-initiative camp. In Mississippi, for
example, fears that African Americans would gain political power fueled the 1922 repeal
of their initiative and referendum process.23 The loudest cry for direct democracy came
from states such as Illinois and New York that had entrenched city political machines.
Corrupt politicians who did not want to lose their power blocked discussion of direct
democracy laws and as a result, citizens were unable to pass binding legislation.24
But with the advent of World War I, xenophobic sentiments increased and many
worried that direct democracy offered German sympathizers easy infiltration into
American politics. As a result, no new states adopted direct democracy until after World
War II, when Alaska joined the union in 1959 and made the process a part of their
constitution. Wyoming, Florida, and the District of Columbia eventually followed suit,
and Illinois, still mired in machine party politics, created a very limited system in 1970.25
Mississippi is the most recent state to enact statewide ballot measures after the 1992
reinstatement of their process.26

22

Gallagher, 2006.
Roy Morgan and David Schauffler, “The Populist I&R Movement,” Direct Democracy in Action, 1996.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
The Initiative and Referendum Institute: “Initiative Process Historical Timeline,” http://www.
iandrinstitute.org/
23
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In the revival of direct democracy, activists found a new avenue to create the
change they wished to see. Inspired by the resurgence of direct democracy, many
initiatives appeared on the ballot in the 1970s as the modern environmental movement
was born. Oregonians proposed and passed a 1970 initiative protecting their scenic
waterways, and in 1972, California voters created the Coastal Zone Conservation
Commission to protect their shores.27
One of the strongest actions for environmentalism grew from within the Nuclear
Freeze movement. Protesters against nuclear weapons decided that they would attempt to
work within the system to end nuclear proliferation. Taking the lessons they had learned
in the 1960s about the power of peaceful protest, over 300 activists gathered in 1981 to
form a national dialogue about a nuclear weapons freeze. By the end of their organizing
effort, a ballot initiative opposing nuclear proliferation was on the ballot in 25 states. As
David Schmidt reports, “By the time the polls closed on 2 November 1982, an
unprecedented one-third of the nation had cast their ballots for or against a bilateral USSoviet ‘freeze’ on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons.”28
Although voters passed a non-binding resolution, this multi-state measure is the closest
the United States has ever come to voting on a national referendum.
Most recently, ballot measures have mostly pertained to tax legislation. This trend
started in 1978 with California’s Proposition 13. The measure, proposed by Howard
Jarvis, Republican politician and anti-tax activist, cut property taxes and capped the rate
at which they could increase. Additionally, taxes could not be raised without a two-thirds

27

M. Dane Waters, Initiative and Referendum Almanac, (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2003),
515.
28
David D. Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution, (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1989), 158.
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vote of the state legislature, known as a “supermajority.”29 Prior to Proposition 13, only
four such measures had been on the ballot in the United States, all of which had been
referred to votes by state legislatures. The law remains in the California law books, but
has repeatedly been an issue of debate because local governments had to increase taxes to
pay for municipal programs such as education and fire departments.30 However, the law
still remains popular in the state of California, with the support of 57 percent of voters.31
This property tax law foreshadowed the Reagan era, encouraging conservative anti-tax
activists to use direct democracy to introduce nationwide the concept of tax relief and
“trickle-down” economics. Tax relief proponents support the idea that government
spending must be cut down, which is be best accomplished by tax cuts. “Trickle-down”
economists believe that by cutting taxes for the wealthy, their increased savings and
investments will benefit the economy.
A second wave of tax measures occurred in the early 1990s. These initiatives,
known as Tax and Expenditure Limits (TEL) decrease taxes using a formula based on
population growth and the consumer price index. In Oklahoma in 1992, anti-tax activist,
Dan Brown, proposed the first TEL. Besides tying taxes to a formula of population
growth and the consumer price index, the question required a majority of three-fourths of
the state legislature or a vote of the people in order to change the law.32 The most famous
of these types of measures because of the number of states in which it has been proposed,
is the Taxpayer Bill of Rights. It was first proposed to Colorado voters in 1992, and I will
29

Waters, 496.
Jeffrey I. Chapman, “Proposition 13: Some Unintended Consequences,” (paper presented at 10th Annual
Envisioning California Conference, The Public Policy Institute, Californa, Sept. 24, 1998).
31
Jennifer Ehn, “The Future of Proposition 13,” (J.D. diss., “Proposition 13 at Twenty-Five,” University of
the Pacific: McGeorge Law School) Available from http://www.mcgeorge.edu/x1471.xml#the_future_
of_proposition_13.
32
Waters, 497.
30
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discuss it at greater length in a case study in order to analyze the current ballot initiative
atmosphere. These TELs exhibit a trend in direct democracy by which initiatives often
reflect national political sentiments. In the late 1960s, initiatives reflected the popular
liberal ideology, by supporting the environment or fighting nuclear proliferation. During
the 1980s when President Reagan encouraged an economic policy of tax cuts, his
supporters used initiatives to enact legislation at the state level that would mirror federal
tax law. As recently as 2004, the Right has lost political clout and that shift has been
mirrored on the ballot as more progressive groups propose legislation. It is strategically
appropriate that such a trend would occur as political activists have the ability recognize a
moment at which certain popular ideologies encourage the passage of a more Right or
Left leaning piece of legislation.
Since the 1970s, there has been much debate about donations and the signature
gathering process for ballot initiatives, which resulted in the need for the courts to outline
procedural regulations. In the cases First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti and Citizens
Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, the Supreme Court decided that corporations can
donate to ballot campaigns legally and that states cannot cap contributions to campaigns
in support of or opposition to ballot measures.33 Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote in
his opinion of the case Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley: “To limit the right of
association places an impermissible restraint on the right of expression.”34 The court
decided that the Constitution’s First Amendment guarantees freedom of expression and
therefore protects petitions. The Supreme Court also removed limitations in signature
gathering. In Meyer v. Grant and Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation,
33

Waters, 497.
“Court Ends Ceiling on Gifts to Referendum Groups,” New York Times, Dec. 15, 1981, B20, Late City
Final Ed..
34

18
the Supreme Court ruled that states cannot prohibit paid signature gathering and cannot
require gatherers to be registered voters.35 They decreed that initiative petitions are
protected speech, citing not only the first amendment, but also states’ rights. Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg wrote in the majority opinion that the Supreme Court needed to be
"vigilant" in protecting citizens from "undue hindrances to political conversations and the
exchange of ideas.”36 Discussions continue today about the practice of fraudulently
reporting donations and gathering signatures as groups have been found guilty of illegal
activity as recently as the 2006 TABOR campaigns in Michigan, Missouri, and
Montana.37
1996 became the high-water mark for ballot initiatives with a record of 94
proposals and 44 adoptions. The initiatives had a broad range in subject matter, covering
among other issues, environmental protection, gambling, and tax reform. Many pundits
claimed that the high turnout resulted from voters who were disillusioned by candidates
who did not pass meaningful legislation. Joan Ponessa, research director at the Public
Affairs Research Institute said, “It's the whole climate of the 1990s. Citizens want more
influence and they think this is the only way they can get something done.”38 And truly,
this is the historical and practical purpose of ballot measures— to offer the people an
option when they feel that their elected officials fail them, to have a voice when theirs has
been taken away.

35

The Initiative and Referendum Institute, “Initiative Process Historical Timeline.”
Linda Greenhouse, “Court Turns Back an Effort to Limit Ballot.” New York Times, Jan. 13, 1999, A1,
Late Ed..
37
Howie Rich from New York City, “Dirty Tactics,” The Ballot Initiative Strategy Center,
http://www.howierichfromnyc.com/tactics.php.
38
Bill Varner, “Citizens Initiate a Record 94 Ballot Questions,” USA Today, Oct. 17, 1996, 4A, Final Ed..
36
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Chapter 2: Case Studies
The Method
I came to the conclusion that a series of case studies would be the best way to
discover the answers to my questions about the effectiveness of progressive coalitions.
Who is included in these coalitions? What messages do coalitions use to convince voters
to support or oppose initiatives and referenda? And do funds determine victory? Case
studies are important because they help to answer why and how rather than what. They
are explanatory rather than predictive.39 Social scientist Robert K. Yin writes that a case
study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are
not clearly evident.”40 The case study offers an opportunity to consider the many cultural
influences that inspired the ballot measure and its surrounding campaign.
I modeled my case studies on Robert M. Alexander’s 2002 study of the effects of
special interest groups on ballot measure campaigns. I chose to use his research strategy
because of the similarities in our objectives and our limitations, particularly the lack of
data available for study. Aside from analyzing campaign spending and the frequency of
measures on the ballot, little research has been completed concerning process, i.e., tactics
and strategies.41 Alexander found little research relating to non-legislative lobbying and
following his approach, I found a lack of analyses of the creation of progressive
coalitions. Because ballot initiatives have only returned as a mainstream form of political
activity in the past ten years, little theory exists about the modern American process. In

39

Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks: Sage Pub., 2003), 6.
Ibid., 13.
41
Alexander,40.
40
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other words, a generally accepted method to predict the outcome of a ballot measure
campaign is unavailable.
Alexander recommends analyzing membership characteristics, group
mobilization, and organizational resources to understand ballot campaigns.42 Since I am
asking slightly different questions than Alexander, I have altered his method for my own
purposes. I have also added the sub-category to group mobilization of an analysis of
message formation in an election. I believe that the strategy that each campaign uses to
convince constituents to support or oppose a measure is unique. To fully assess
successful campaigns, we need to understand which values and ideas appeal to voters in
each state. It is also essential to study campaign finance in order to understand whether
money determines success.

The Cases
I chose three 2006 ballot initiatives with varied election results. The first is the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights from Maine, which was proposed by conservatives and defeated
by a progressive coalition. The Taxpayer Bill of Rights proposed to limit the rate by
which taxes could increase, which would limit state spending on social programs. The
next is Missouri Minimum Wage, which won with the support of a progressive coalition.
The Missouri minimum wage campaign would raise the minimum pay from $5.15 to
$6.50 an hour, a rate which would continue to rise with the cost of living. Finally, I
decided to examine a failed progressive measure, Renewable Energy in California. This
bill, Proposition 87 for renewable energy, proposed a ten-year $4 billion dollar program
to reduce oil and gas usage by 25%. Had Proposition 87 passed, it would have enacted an
42

Alexander, 40.
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oil production severance tax to fund the program. The bill would have been funded by a
tax on in-state oil producers and drillers.
Alexander cautions against a small or unvarying data pool because a criticism of
the case study is that it cannot be applied to a larger scale, or to more than just the
specific situations analyzed. He underlines the importance of “analytic generalization” or,
the expansion of and generalization of theory.43 Following Alexander’s strategy, I chose
ballot initiatives relating to three different issues in three demographically different
states. The issues addressed in these measures have recently and frequently been on the
ballot. Renewable energy and the Taxpayer Bill of Rights fall into the two most popular
categories in the direct democracy sphere: the environment and taxation respectively. In
2006, citizens in six states placed initiatives on the ballot to raise the minimum wage,
making it a new popular ballot measure (Appendix 1).
Not only do the issues in my case studies vary, but also the states in which they
occurred are distinctly different. These three measures span the country, from
Northeastern Maine to Midwestern Missouri and West Coast California. Additionally, the
populations of the state differ greatly, which provides a broad range of state size to study.
California has the largest population in the United States (pop. 36,457,549); Missouri is a
middling-size state (pop. 5,842,713); and Maine is in the bottom fifth of population rank
(pop. 1,321,574).44 The cases also differ in terms of who composes the population of the
states. Maine is a predominantly Caucasian and aging state, whereas Missouri is slightly
more racially diverse and has a large youth population. California is the most racially
diverse of the three, with large Asian and Hispanic populations, and it is also the
43
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youngest state of the three.45 These factors influence the decisions that voters make at the
polls based on generational and racial differences in ideology.
The popularity of direct democracy differs in these three states. California has
become famous in recent years for the sheer volume of issues on their ballot. Alexander
writes, “Moreover, it is widely recognized that California is a bastion for controversial
ballot measures and for astronomical sums of money spent by opponents in ballot
campaigns.”46 In 2006, they ranked third in the country for number of ballot questions,
with thirteen citizen-originated and referred measures. Maine had a low number of
proposed measures, with just two on the ballot, but it is one of the few states to allow
ballot measures in midyear elections.47 Mainers are accustomed to voting on legislation;
this makes it an ideal state to study because citizens are more likely to vote the more
accustomed they are to seeing measures on the ballot. In 2006, Missouri had five
initiatives and referenda, a median between Maine and California. Although Missouri
does not allow for midyear measures, it tends to have a few measures on the ballot each
year. Missouri has historically had a low rate of measure passage; in the past twenty
years, however, this trend has changed dramatically with the support of more than 60% of
measures.48
My first case study is the Maine Taxpayer Bill of Rights. It is a part of the nearly
thirty year history of Tax and Expenditure Limitation initiatives.
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Case Study: The Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR)
BACKGROUND

Maine consistently ranks in the top five on lists of the best education systems in
the country. In fact, The Children’s Rights Council in Washington, DC said that Maine is
the best state in the nation to raise a child.49 Maine is also known for its affordable health
care program, Dirigo, and its beautiful state parks. It is likely that the quality of life in
Maine is so satisfying because Maine ranks in the top twenty percent in the country for
high taxes. According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2005 report, Maine citizens pay more
per capita than the national average, which is $2,189.84. Mainers pay $2,323.12 per
capita.50 It is a wonder that TABOR did not pass, even though Maine has some of the
highest taxes per capita in the United States. Voters rejected the law due to the work of a
strong progressive coalition opposed to TABOR.
Many Mainers believe that it is time for tax relief, especially when it comes to
property taxes, and so in recent years, various groups have proposed Tax and Expenditure
Limitation (TEL) initiatives. A TEL prescribes tax rates following a strict mathematical
equation based on the population growth and the consumer price index. 51 In 2004,
conservative tax activist Carol Palesky of Maine Taxpayer Action Network proposed a
TEL initiative that would cap property tax rate at 1 percent of the assessed value of the
land. The pro-tax cap campaign used the message that the tax system currently in place
forced the elderly to sell their homes and promised that even if the TEL were enacted,
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municipal services would remain unchanged.52 Opponents of her tax cap called the
measure the "Palesky meat-ax initiative," predicting that its passage would result in large
budget cuts for municipal public works and education.53 Ultimately, voters rejected the
measure by nearly 55%.54 This did not signify that Maine does not need tax reform, as
nearly 45% of the state supported the bill. The voters decided that the Palesky cap was
just not the correct solution.
Mainers were offered another solution to high taxes in the autumn of 2006, when
they were presented with a conservative ballot measure called the Taxpayer Bill of Rights
(TABOR). TABOR also used a population growth and consumer price index equation to
limit the rate of tax increase and included the provision that the law could only be altered
by a vote of the people or a supermajority (a two-thirds vote) of the state legislature.55
The TABOR revenue cap also causes a “ratchet effect,” in which funding decreases each
year that the state uses the equation to determine taxes because the equation is based on
the prior year.56 When a law is a constitutional amendment, the guidelines to change it
are much stricter. By creating TABOR as a constitutional amendment, proponents of the
bill believed TABOR to be a long-term tax plan for Maine.
Coloradoans passed a similar amendment to their state constitution in 1992, which
provided a good example to voters of what might result if TABOR succeeded in Maine.
Colorado at first had a successful experience with TABOR, finding that it brought
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personal income and sales tax rates to a reasonable level. Additionally, taxpayers
received a refund from the state with money that had been cut from the budget.57
However, immigration slowed, inflation decreased, and the equation of inflation plus
population growth provided far too little revenue to support social and administrative
programs necessary for the state’s well being. Republicans and Democrats alike realized
that TABOR was hurting their state and voted in 2005 to suspend TABOR for five years
in an attempt to re-energize their state. In Maine, the difficult task that faced the antiTABOR coalition was convincing Mainers that TABOR would be equally destructive in
Maine as it had been in Colorado.

MEMBERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS: SUPPORTERS

Howie Rich is the multi-millionaire Chairman of Americans for Limited
Government, an organization that uses Rich’s money to help interest groups around the
country to place measures such as TABOR on the ballot. In Maine, the group donated
$131, 962.50 to the pro-TABOR campaign, nearly one-half of their budget.58 In 2006,
nine TABOR petitions were submitted across the country and Secretary of State Offices
in Maine, Nebraska, and Oregon approved the measure. In some states, courts uncovered
illegal signature gathering by out-of-state residents, disqualifying those petitions.59 In
Maine, a conservative coalition in support of the measure did not exist, but The Maine
Heritage Policy Center (MHPC) strongly backed the measure with the help of a few local
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businesses and chambers of commerce. MHPC is “a research and educational
organization whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies.”60
It is important to note that MHPC is not a member-oriented group, but rather a research
center. This means that they did not have a base of members to be easily mobilized to
vote on Election Day.
In Maine, Mary Adams, a well-known anti-tax activist, led the drive for petition
signatures. The campaign she promoted supported the message that Mainers pay some of
the highest taxes in the country, limiting job creation and the ability of Mainers to
provide for their families. 61 The campaign was especially successful in reminding voters
that they had been paying high taxes for a long time and offered TABOR as a lifesaver.
Adams said, “We're awful glad that the taxpayers and the voters will have an opportunity
to vote on this… I think they'll grab it just like a drowning man would grab a flotation
ring.”62 Instead, a coalition formed a with a strong campaign strategy to combat TABOR.

MEMBERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS: THE PROGRESSIVE COALITION

When progressive groups in Maine learned of TABOR, they concluded that the
TABOR formula would ultimately cut many social programs in Maine. More than twenty
groups formed a coalition called Citizens United to Protect Our Public Safety, Schools
and Communities. The coalition included more than twenty groups, including the
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), Sheriffs and Firefighters, the Council
of Churches, local unions, the Maine Women’s Lobby, the Maine Center for Economic
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Policy, and the League of Young Voters. Clearly, this group represents a broad scope of
issues and demographics, offering access to many different voter target groups.
Unofficially, the coalition also received support from the University of Maine System
and the Maine Blueprint Project.63 The Maine Blueprint Project, now known as Engage
Maine, promotes “a progressive vision that successfully articulates and inspires an active,
compassionate public policy process and government that provides innovative programs
for its citizens.”64 They had recently received a large grant from The Proteus Fund, much
of which they donated to the anti-TABOR campaign.65 The Proteus Fund is a public
interest group that supports groups engaged in social justice work.66 Overall, the coalition
created a broad-reaching network of organizations dedicated to defeating TABOR.
The consensus among member groups was that coalitions work. Not only did
combining member organizations create a larger outreach group, but also confirmed a
platform to appeal to Mainers. One of the few difficulties that the coalition encountered
was trying to convince national organizations that offered campaign help that the Maine
message could not be the same as that in other states. Mark Gray of the MEA said, “Our
message was very Maine-specific. The AARP typically is a more nationally driven
organization and so they wanted us to use their own set of talking points with a generic
message. We worked very hard to get the national folks to be consistent with our
message.”67
A 2006 voter poll showed that due to a stagnant economy, nearly 71% of Mainers
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planned to support TABOR in November 2006.68 However, when Mainers began to hear
just how many organizations thought that TABOR would be a poor choice for Maine,
they began to change their opinions. Amy Thompson of the Maine People’s Alliance
believes that it was neighbor-to-neighbor interactions that created a real change in the
TABOR campaign: “Unless you’re sitting down with people, shifting their world view,
you have not shot in hell [of winning].”69 The Maine People’s Alliance (MPA) did a great
deal of outreach work to change voters’ minds about TABOR. In fact, they organized 416
volunteers to knock on 70,470 doors, 15,759 of those doors were knocked on in the
month of October. The MPA also organized 85 meetings and house parties, created
phone banks to make 44,723 personal phone calls and arranged 22,000 automated calls.70
This dedication to fighting TABOR was important to show Mainers that their neighbors
had very strong feelings against the law, even if taxes would remain the same. The
campaign was successful because coalition groups communicated with their core
members to easily mobilize volunteers to hand out literature, make phone calls, attend
rallies, and write letters to the editors in local newspapers. This strategy of Mainers
speaking to Mainers gave the movement a great deal of power.

GROUP MOBILIZATION: MESSAGE FORMATION

When faced with the prospect of overcoming a daunting amount of public support
for TABOR, Citizens United decided that they needed to hire a public relations agency to
frame a message for their campaign. They found Savvy Inc., a seasoned firm based in
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Portland, Maine, which had worked on such progressive political campaigns as
Campaign to Save Working Waterfront Jobs, John Baldacci for Governor, and Freeport
Community Services.71 Savvy Inc. created a three-pronged, pro-Maine, anti-TABOR
message: “TABOR doesn’t work. It won’t save you money. It will take away local
autonomy and control.” This message spoke not only to Mainers’ sense of individuality,
but also to a general dislike of organizations that attempt to influence policy from out-ofstate. One group that used this message especially well is the League of Young Voters.
They helped advertise that an out-of-state organization created TABOR with the slogan
“Their dream, our nightmare.”72 These posters explained in one sentence that TABOR
was not home grown and that it would be disastrous for Maine. The most successful
messages spoke directly to the ideology of Mainers who have a dislike for out-of-staters
who try to steer Maine politically.73
Savvy Inc. also created a message that members of the coalition could tailor to
their target audience; “TABOR will hurt fill in the blank.”74 In this space, community
organizations spoke about a broad range of topics including health care, the environment,
and K-12 education.75 Mark Grey of the Maine Education Association said that his
organization conducted polls to learn the demographic makeup of a Maine voter who
would oppose TABOR. The MEA found that females with school age children were most
likely to oppose TABOR and so his organization worked especially hard to bring these
women to the polls, campaigning against TABOR with automated phone calls and direct

71

Savvy, Inc., “Who got Savvy?,” http://savvy-inc.com/whogot.html.
Alec Maybarduk.
73
Ibid.
74
Ibid.
75
See Appendix 1. “TABOR Maine People’s Alliance literature drop,” document provided by Amy
Thompson, Communications and Development Director, Maine People’s Alliance.
72

30
mail. The MEA also learned that the Board and Chancellor of the University of Maine
System opposed TABOR and worked with them to send a TABOR fact sheet to over
100,000 University of Maine alumni. By the end of the anti-TABOR campaign, the MEA
sent out 600,000 pieces of direct mail and recorded 400,000 automated phone messages.
Those in the targeted demographic received two calls prior to election week, two during
election week, and one more on Election Day to ensure they were convinced to oppose
TABOR.76 These messages worked because these groups function outside of the election
season and their constituents trust that the advice they receive from their leaders is
valuable and true. Mark Gray said, “If you hear the message from an organization that
you already have confidence in, you’re likely to listen and participate.”77 This continued
relationship encourages voter mobilization and turnout. This was especially relevant to
members of Citizens United because many were civil servants and thus are likely to have
greater ties to the community.
The AARP created one of the most effective messages of the campaign, using
both newsprint and television media to help Mainers to understand how TABOR would
directly influence their lives. They quoted Bangor, Maine City Manager, Ed Barret, in
their online bulletin: “It would require the city to place a measure on the ballot to raise
greens fees at municipal golf courses, he says, or raise landing fees at Bangor's airport,
which runs under a separate enterprise authority.”78 When Mainers began to think about
how TABOR would alter their daily lives, they became more convinced that voting in its
favor would be a poor choice for Maine.
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But the greatest victory for the AARP message framers was a commercial about
the devastating effects of TABOR on social services. The commercial, which aired
during the 2006 election season, portrayed an elderly woman, a young female student,
and various public service providers playing musical chairs. The narrator says:
A set budget works great when there’s enough to go around.
But what do you do when the unexpected happens and you need funding?
Something’s gotta give. TABOR doesn’t target government waste and can’t fully
fund public services. TABOR is a bad idea.79
When the music stops, there are not enough chairs for everyone to sit down and the little
girl and elderly lady are left standing. This spoke vividly to the way TABOR would
continuously decrease the amount of money saved in the state’s “rainy day fund” after
budget cuts. This message spoke very clearly to Mainers who worried about natural
disasters and decreasing public safety services. The anti-TABOR campaign warned that
with tax cuts, the state would be unable to maintain ambulance, police, and fire services.
Additionally, many Mainers remembered the Ice Storm of 1998, which debilitated the
state.80 Many voters believed that if TABOR were approved, a catastrophe could occur
and the state government would not have enough money to protect Mainers.

ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES: CAMPAIGN SPENDING

There has been much talk in the media lately about exorbitant spending of
presidential candidates. For the July-September 2006 filing period, Democratic front
runners Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama spent $22.6 million and $21.5 million,
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respectively, and Republican Mitt Romney spent $21.3 million.81 Ballot campaigns have
also spent more as recent elections proved that such politically polarizing issues as
abortion and gay marriage turned out voters. This is, in part, due to what political analysts
at the Ballot Initiative Strategy Center call “the spillover effect.”82 Many times when
voters turn out for controversial issues, they will also vote for likeminded candidates.
Recently, the Democratic and Republican parties have offered support to ballot measures,
and candidates have run for or against the “hot button” issue. This occurred in the 2006
Maine gubernatorial race, when Republican candidate Chandler Woodcock ran as a proTABOR candidate against incumbent Democrat John Baldacci, who was anti-TABOR.83
The anti-TABOR campaign did not receive the majority of its funding until later
in the campaign after Citizens United had garnered a great deal of support. Donors were
unwilling to contribute to the campaign unless they knew that the coalition had any
chance of winning. Door-knocking and phone banking was imperative to this campaign
because it proved to national organizations that TABOR could be defeated. In fact, it was
not until the very end of September that the majority of out-of-state organizations such as
large trade unions began to donate to the campaign.
Unions played a very important part in the anti-TABOR campaign. Many national
unions became involved with the campaign and donated large sums in opposition to
TABOR. Local chapters of American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME), Service Employees International Union (SEIU), and the Maine
81
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Education Association (MEA) contacted their national offices to fundraise. These three
groups donated a combined sum of over $820,000.84 Over the past ten years, union power
has declined, as many of the larger unions have experienced leadership infighting and
disorganization. Progressives should worry about the future of coalitions because the
participation of unions is very important to fundraisers and organizers. If progressives
hope to continue to win elections, it is necessary to fiscally and politically support this
important work.
Other national non-profits and businesses also donated a great deal to the antiTABOR campaign, especially the AARP.85 This meant that Citizens United ultimately
had the ability to spend $2 million, outspending the pro-TABOR campaign at a rate of
approximately 5-to-1.86 It is important to reiterate that had it not been for the organizing
efforts of Citizens United, these out-of-state organizations would not have contributed to
this campaign. The progressive coalition with a strongly framed message and the support
of hundreds of volunteers, and the money to convince Mainers to defeat TABOR.
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Case Study: Alternative Energy, Research, Production, Incentives.
BACKGROUND

The state of California is infamous for consistently having long list of ballot
questions. In 2006, California had the third highest number of initiatives in the country,
trailing Arizona and Colorado, which had nineteen and fourteen initiatives,
respectively.87 This high number of initiatives often leads to voter confusion and
frustration. Although states with multiple ballot initiatives have roughly a four percent
turnout increase in presidential elections and a roughly eight percent increase in midterm
elections, voters become overwhelmed by the amount of information they receive from
campaigns when the number of initiatives is too high.88 As a senior aid to Former
President Bill Clinton, Karen Skelton said, “The electorate’s in a real pissy mood…
they’re tired of the initiative process.”89 Because polarizing issues often turn out voters,
negative campaigning often occurs in California to ensure that frustrated voters still turn
out to the polls. Bruce Cain, director of the Institute of Governmental Studies at UC
Berkeley commented on this idea, “Negative messages are seen as credible… because
people are skeptical, they don't read the measures closely, and they're willing to believe
the negative information.”90 This type of campaigning was prominent during the 2006
Proposition 87 campaign for the creation of an alternative energy program.
If Proposition 87 had passed, it would have enacted an oil production severance
tax, which is a tax on any mineral or product that can be taken from the ground. The
profit from this tax would have been deposited into the California Energy Independence
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Fund, to be used to create and promote alternative energy programs. Oil wells more than
three miles off shore or wells that produce no more than ten barrels a day would not be
taxed. The estimate in 2005 for the total amount to be taxed was 200 million barrels of
oil.91 Depending on the price at which the barrels were sold, the tax would range from
1.5% for $10-$25 barrels to 6.0% for barrels costing $60.01 or more.92 Significantly, the
law states that producers are not allowed to increase the cost of oil, gasoline, or diesel
fuel based on the tax-induced increase in production cost.
The measure dictates that the revenue for the severance tax would be used to
create a new California Energy Alternatives Program Authority, which would be
empowered to spend $4 billion dollars over ten years. The Authority would consist of the
Secretary for Environmental Protection, the Chair of the State Energy Resources
Conservation and Development Commission, a treasurer, and six members of the public
who have knowledge of “economics, public health, venture capital, energy efficiency,
entrepreneurship, and consumer advocacy.”93 The severance tax would expire after this
money had been spent, unless bonds were issued.
The proposition charges the California Energy Alternative Program Authority
with the responsibility of spending in five areas: gasoline and diesel use reduction,
research, commercial energy alternatives, public education, and alternative energy
vocational training. To reduce dependency on gasoline and diesel, severance tax revenues
would be used for incentives such as consumer loans and grants to buy alternative fuel
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vehicles. The majority of the money (57.50%) would be spent in this area.94 Grants and
loans would also be created for alternative energy research. These would be available to
university and private research groups to “improve the economic viability and accelerate
the commercialization of renewable energy technologies and energy efficiency
technologies.”95 Businesses would also be eligible to receive incentives to begin research
and manufacture of renewable energy, energy efficient, and alternative energy products.
Two education programs would be created under Proposition 87: public and vocational.
This would ensure that the public became aware of their alternative energy options and
that citizens could be trained at community colleges to work with new energy
technologies. The remainder of the budget would be used for administrative costs.
Traditionally, California has had a strong investment in gasoline, not only because
there are more registered automobiles in California than in any other state (nearly double
the number of the second place state of Texas), but also because California is the third
largest oil producing state in the country.96 In 2005, California contributed 12% of
United States oil production, producing 230 million barrels of oil at an average of
630,000 gallons per day.97 Although 37% of California’s oil is produced in-state, 21% of
its oil is Alaskan and the majority of oil used in-state, 42%, is supplied by foreign
countries.98 As a result, Californians pay high prices for gasoline; in fact, as of May 2008,
they spend the most in the country at nearly $3.90 a gallon for regular grade and up to
$4.11 a gallon for premium. The national average is $3.60 for regular grade and $3.85 for
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premium.99
As a result of the substantial number of automobiles in state, California has the
worst air quality in the country. In fact, half of California’s counties failed the American
Lung Association’s 2003-2005 clean air tests and only one of the 58 qualified as a clean
air county.100 As a result of these studies, the American Lung Association warns
Californians each year of the high risks of asthma, cancer, and lung disease. For example,
the worst air quality is in Los Angeles, where by the age of two months, a child has
already inhaled the Environmental Protection Agency’s lifetime limit of toxins for cancer
risk. Additionally, in California there are 3.3 million school absences a year because of
asthma.101 A study at the University of Southern California studied children over an eight
year period and found that those who grew up in a polluted environment are five times
more likely to develop lung damage, even if they never had lung problems before.
Proponents hoped that Proposition 87’s alternative energy proposal would be popular
among voters due to the poor health conditions in their state.
California has a large auto market and so automobile producers must follow
California vehicle laws and standards or they will not sell enough cars to reach profit
goals. California has a long history of being at the forefront of the environmental
movement, imposing automobile emission standards more strict than those imposed at the
national level, which car companies must then follow. In 2005, California Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger announced the Breathe Easier campaign, noting that cars put
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2700 tons of pollutants into the air daily.102 The State Assembly passed a bill in
conjunction with the campaign, but the automobile industry sued, claiming the law put an
unreasonable burden on their companies because national regulations are much less strict
than California’s. When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Bush Administration
intervened on behalf of the businesses, even though the state of California had won in
lower courts, claiming that the law would not help the weakening national economy. The
California law dictated that cars must have lower fuel pipe emissions, but the industry
claimed it impossible to limit fuel pipe emissions without also regulating fuel
efficiency.103 The Supreme Court decision prevented states from creating fuel pipe
emission laws stricter than the national standard.
Proposition 87 proponents did not believe that the initiative was unreasonable
because it would apply rules already imposed in other states. California oil companies
pay taxes on their product, but avoid certain fees applicable in other states. They must
pay a regulatory fee of 6.2 cents per barrel of oil to the Department of Conservation to
support a program that oversees drilling, operation, and maintenance of oil wells. In
2006-2007, the revenue of this tax totaled $14 million.104. Oil producers must also pay
local property taxes on the value of their equipment and recoverable oil. However,
California is the only state that does not have a severance tax. In most states, this includes
anyone who extracts oil from the ground or water, owns stock in oil, or owns or manages
an oil well. Due to the lack of a severance tax, those who proposed the initiative believed
that it would not be difficult to pass a law that every other oil producing state already had
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in place.

MEMBERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS: THE PROGRESSIVE PROPONENTS

Proposition 87 attracted the support of non-profits, politicians, and celebrities.
These progressives believed that by passing a severance tax, California would become a
leader among states in the movement for alternative energy. The greatest proponents of
the initiative were the groups the California American Lung Association (CALA), the
California Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Foundation for Taxpayer
and Consumer Rights (FTCR).105 The CALA and the EPA supported this measure
because of California’s failing air standards and high rates of asthma and the FTCR
supported the measure because it favored more energy options for California consumers.
They also had strong support from California Doctors and Nurses and the nonprofit
Coalition for Clean Air.
Democratic politicians also provided strong support for Proposition 87, campaigning
throughout the state. Former President Bill Clinton spoke at many locations in California
and the campaign featured him in a television advertisement. At the University of
California, Los Angeles he said, “[No on 87] is designed to slow down America’s
transformation to a clear independent energy economy.”106 Former Vice President Al
Gore also supported Proposition 87, speaking with the authority of the creator of the
critically acclaimed documentary film about global warming, An Inconvenient Truth.
Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA), Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and the
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Democratic State Central Committee also joined this group of politicians.107
The greatest support for the initiative did not come from progressive groups, but from
individuals in Hollywood and venture capitalists. Such celebrities as Tom Hanks, Rita
Wilson, Robert Reiner, and Warner Brothers President Alan F. Horn provided fiscal
support.108 Actors Ben Affleck, Julia Roberts, Robert Redford, and Geena Davis
campaigned for the Proposition.109 Venture capitalists such as Vinod Khosla, William
Randolph Hearst III, and John Doerr donated a great deal to the campaign, but like the
Hollywood supporters, they donated money, but not time.110 This financial support did
not create a strong coalition of member organizations dedicated to spreading the
Proposition 87 message. Although large organizations such as the ALA and the EPA
supported the initiative, the campaign lacked a powerful grassroots presence.
It could be posited that Proposition 87 failed in California because of the state’s size
or due to a lack of interest, but it seems that it was the lack of participation of state unions
that led to the failure of the measure. It is not that this power structure does not exist
because only a year before, a coalition of California’s largest unions, the Alliance for a
Better California, defeated Governor Schwarzenegger after he called for a special
election to propose four initiatives, two of which were explicitly anti-union. Proposition
74 would have extended the probationary period for teachers and Proposition 75 second
would have required unions of public employees to get annual state permission to use
their dues for political purposes. The alliance consisted of nurses, police officers teachers,
and firefighters. The unions worked together and spent more than $100 million on media,
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phone banking, and canvassing.111 The California Nurses Association (CNA) led much of
the campaign, contributing to advertising with commercials during an A&E channel
biopic called “See Arnold Run,” accusing him of being “driven by greed and profits.”112
Due to this strong on-the-ground campaigning, Californians rejected both measures by
55%-45% and 53%-47% respectively.113
The Yes on 87 campaign might have been more successful if they had received the
grassroots support of the CNA and other unions and community groups. The nurses,
however, proposed their own message on the 2006 ballot. Each year the CNA creates a
voter guide and they endorsed their measure, Proposition 89, with “Yes, yes, yes.”
However, Proposition 87 received only a “Yes.” 114 From this endorsement sheet alone, it
is obvious where the CNA chose to focus their power. California also has a very large
environmental community, with 165 environmental organizations listed on eco-usa.net.
The state of California also has an active Environmental Protection Agency, which
enforces green legislation with education and inspection.115 It was not a lack of interest or
a difficulty in creating a coalition that led to the failure of the measure, but rather the
overconfidence of large donors who believed that money alone could win an election.

MEMBERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS: OPPONENTS

The most adamant opposition to Proposition 87 was from the oil companies. Oil
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giants such as Chevron and Aera Energy (the umbrella company for Exxon and Shell)
were the most vocal of these companies, contributing the majority of the No on 87’s
campaign budget.116 The oil companies were not, however, publicly vocal. Instead,
members of the coalition against Proposition 87 spoke for them, groups such as
California Chamber of Commerce, Californians Against Higher Taxes, and California
Small Business Alliance.
In fact, a large coalition grew in opposition to Proposition 87. The coalition of more
than 350 individuals and groups had a strong presence in communities with member such
as the California Coalition of Law Enforcement, the California State Firefighters
Association, and the California School Boards Association.117 These organizations all
worried that if Proposition 87 passed, local property tax revenues would decrease and
would not be enough to pay for gasoline needed to fuel fire trucks, police cars, and school
buses. Past President of the California School Boards Association Marian Bergeson
wrote, “On top of the revenue impact of this initiative, the higher fuel prices that come as
a result of taxing California-produced oil will place an additional strain on school district
transportation budgets.”118 Bergeson, like many other public service employees, based
her opinion on a study done by the California Legislative Analyst’s Office, which found
that “If the measure is successful in reducing the use of oil-based fuels in the state, this
would reduce the taxes paid on these fuels.”119 Although this point was only a small part
of the study, it was effective in convincing California public service groups, such as
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teachers and firefighters, that Proposition 87 could negatively influence their programs.
This local coalition opposed to Proposition 87 in conjunction with a large-scale
advertising campaign provided the necessary publicity to defeat the measure.

GROUP MOBILIZATION: MESSAGE FORMATION

When framing their message, Yes on 87 created a three-pronged message of
saving the planet, improving national security, and creating new jobs for young people.
Proponents pushed this message in advertising and on the campaign trail. Speaking at the
University of California at Los Angeles, Bill Clinton repeated these three points. He said,
“California is given an opportunity and obligation to do something remarkable to save the
planet, improve our national security, and create the next generation of jobs for the
American people.”120 Other Yes on 87 campaigners, such as Al Gore, linked national
security and the end of depending on foreign countries for oil. In his first political
advertisement since his presidential run in 2000, Gore spoke in favor of Proposition 87:
Here is the truth the oil companies won't tell you. Half the foreign oil they import
to California is from the Middle East. As a result, California is dangerously
dependent on foreign oil. Proposition 87 means more alternative fuels, wind and
solar power. And that means less oil dependence. Prop. 87 is the one thing
Californians can do now to clean up the air, help stop the climate crisis and free
us from foreign oil. The sooner we do it, the safer we will be.121
These messages spoke to both local and national fears of terrorism and the poor state of
the United States economy. But another message that ran throughout the campaign spoke
directly to Californians.
The Yes on 87 campaign counted on the very high cost of oil in California to
sway citizens to vote for the initiative. While campaigning for Proposition 87, Executive
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Director of the Foundation for Consumer and Taxpayer Rights, Doug Heller said “[voters
have] a lot of visceral anger at oil companies that will drive passage of the initiative…
Voters’ anger will help the initiative overcome the up to $40 million that the oil
companies will raise to try to defeat it.122 While campaigning, Former President Bill
Clinton also reminded voters that although oil companies would like to tell Californians
that they would have to pay for the cost of the severance tax at the pump, that this just
was not so. He said, “Now, I know the oil companies trot around some economists in
their ads, but let me ask you something; if they really thought you were going to pay for
this, would they be spending all that money to convince you to vote against it?” 123
However, the Yes on 87 campaign failed in promoting this message because they did not
have the grassroots support to combat big money advertising campaigns.
As Bill Clinton had explained, No on 87 framed their campaign with one
message: if the initiative passed, prices at the pump would increase. Having a very large
budget, the No on 87 campaign could afford to flood the airways with this message. One
advertisement paid for by Californians Against Higher Taxes “warn[ed] consumers that
the initiative would shrink California’s oil supply and increase the state’s dependence on
foreign oil. The added costs of the imported oil would be ‘lawfully passed onto the
consumer.’”124
Advertisements paid for by the oil companies pinpointed poorer communities that
would be most adversely affected by an increase in the price of oil. One such
advertisement featured an African American woman filling up her car with gasoline with
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a horrified look on her face. Van Jones of the Ella Baker Center for Human Rights said,
“The ads were used to help bring out black votes to defeat Proposition 87… The oil
companies tried to scare blacks into thinking that the tax on the companies would be
passed on at the pump.” Due to the fact that little Yes on 87 grassroots work existed
during election season, voters continued to believe these advertisements. Jones said, “The
polluters were able to stampede the poor into their camp… I never want to see an
NAACP leader on the wrong side of an environment issue again.”125

ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES: CAMPAIGN SPENDING

Proposition 87 was the most expensive ballot initiative campaign in the history of
direct democracy in the United States. With contributors from the oil industry, venture
capitalism, and Hollywood, the two campaigns spent $153,178, 162.126 The wealthiest
donors to this campaign contributed $110 million. Oil companies spent over $60 million
on No on 87 and amongst venture capitalists and Hollywood insiders gave nearly $50
million to the Yes on 87 campaign.127
The two largest donors to the Yes on 87 campaign were Hollywood producer
Stephen Bing and venture capitalist Vinod Khosla. Bing donated $49,762,610 in addition
to providing numerous loans to the campaign.128 Bing first became involved with the
proposition when Hollywood screenwriter and producer Anthony Rubenstein called him
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to tell him about the cause.129 Vinod Khosla was the second largest donor, giving over $1
million. He is a co-founder of Sun Microsystems and a partner both in the venture capital
firm Kleiner Perkins Caulfield & Byers of Silicon Valley, and in his own firm, Khosla
Ventures.130 Although Khosla has strong interests in ethanol and alternative energy
companies that would receive grants as a result of Proposition 87, he said in an interview
that he would “donate 100-percent of all profits I personally get from any company that
receives any funding from Prop. 87 and I will donate 100 percent of my personal profits
from that company to charity.”131 Other major fiscal supporters include Khosla’s partner
at Kleiner Perkins, John Doerr, who donated $950,000, in addition to making loans, and
Google Co-Founder Larry Page, who donated $1 million.132
A progressive campaign cannot defeat a well-funded conservative campaign if it
does not have strong grassroots support. Although such a coalition against Proposition 87
existed, the majority of the donations came from large oil companies and this large
budget became a deciding factor in the outcome of the election. In fact, three companies
donated 88% of the campaign’s budget. Aera Energy Inc. donated $26,066,152, the
Chevron Corporation donated $41,550,000, and Occidental Oil and Gas Corporation
donated $6 million. These oil companies outspent the entire Yes on 87 campaign by more
than $20 million, which allowed them to flood the airwaves with their message and
convince Californians to vote no. In 2006, the three propositions on the California ballot
that challenged large corporations all failed. Jamie Court, campaign and President of
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Santa Monica-based Taxpayer and Consumer Rights said, “Every initiative with money
against it went down. It was the money that spoke. Right now, it’s a process unusable for
anyone except people that have money. That’s not democracy, that’s a market.”133
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Case Study: Minimum Wage Increase.
BACKGROUND

Many Missourians are employed in minimum wage jobs or in service industries in
which their pay scale is based on minimum wage. Before the passage of Proposition B,
an initiative to increase minimum wage in Missouri, the state followed the national rate
(set in 1997) of $5.15 per hour. The national minimum wage was not readjusted until
2007, even though the cost of living increased by 26 percent. When adjusted for inflation,
the minimum wage was at its lowest purchasing power since 1955. In 2006, the authors
of Proposition B proposed to raise the minimum wage to $6.50 on January 1, 2007 per
hour, and to annually readjust it for inflation and cost of living increases. 134 The initiative
passed with 76 percent support from Missourians.135 The existence of Proposition B on
the ballot was part of a trend in U.S. ballot initiative campaigns, as Missouri joined five
other states to vote on minimum wage increases, including Arizona, Colorado, Montana,
Nevada, and Ohio. These six states followed 22 states and the District of Columbia in
increasing the minimum wage.136 This was not only a signal from the American public
that Congress needed to reassess the 1997 minimum wage standards, but it was also the
first time since the anti-nuclear proliferation ballot initiatives in 1981 that progressives
had launched a multi-state ballot initiative strategy.
The coalition supporting the raise in minimum wage convinced such a large
percentage of Missourians supported Proposition B because a great number of the state’s
citizens are minimum wage workers. In fact, 42,000 Missourians work for minimum
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wage, 71 percent of whom are 20 or older and 44 percent of whom are full time minimum
wage workers.137 Additionally, 36 percent of minimum wage earners work half time (2034 hours per week).138 The pay scales of many jobs are proportional to the minimum
wage. Many of these jobs are in the largest occupational groups in Missouri, such as
retail salespeople, cashiers, and food preparation and serving workers (including fast
food). Overall, this accounts for 256,000 people, approximately 10 percent of employees
in Missouri, who in addition support their 120,000 child dependents.139 This means that
many Missourians depend on minimum wage for their annual income. However, with an
annual income of $10,712, fulltime minimum wage workers made nearly $6,000 below
the poverty level for a family of three.140 For the families of 46 percent of these workers,
a minimum wage job is their sole source of income.141
The high level of support for the initiative shows a broad understanding of wage
difficulties in state. In fact, many Missourians receive less pay than most Americans. The
median household income for Missouri in 1999 was $37,934 which, according to the
2000 U.S. Census, was $3,500 less than the national average.142 Although this median
salary is higher than the yearly income for a minimum wage worker, it reflects pay that
many workers receive in which wages are often proportionate to minimum wage, i.e., a
dollar or two more than the set minimum wage. The Missouri Budget Project projected
that the number of workers affected by a minimum wage increase would be much higher
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than merely those who received the $5.15 per hour.143 Essentially, the median Missouri
salary was lower than the national average because spillover pay in Missouri was still
lower than the average national spillover wage and because Missouri has a high
percentage of minimum wage earners.144
Proposition B and the other 2006 minimum wage ballot initiatives evidence the
power of citizen-proposed legislation to draw national attention. In addition to the six
states that considered minimum wage question, a ten-year high of eleven similar bills
passed in state legislatures across the country in 2006. In fact, “in the past two years,
more states have raised their minimum-wage rates than in the 68-year-history of the
federal minimum wage law.”145 After the passage of the six ballot initiatives and national
polls showing strong bipartisan citizen support, Representative George Miller (DCalifornia) introduced H.R. 2, the “Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007” into a newly
elected Democratic Congress. When introducing the bill to the House of Representatives,
Rep. Miller said it was “an up-or-down vote saying whether the poorest people working
in the country deserve a raise.”146 The bill passed, increasing the minimum wage to $5.85
an hour, to be incrementally increased over two years and two months to $7.25 an
hour.147 According to a study done by the Economic Policy Institute, 5.6 million
Americans earning minimum wage were directly affected by the passage of H.R. 2.148
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The passage of H.R. 2 was the result of direct democracy.
Unique to Proposition B is the effect that occurred in the Missouri Senatorial race;
voters who turned out for progressive ballot issues also voted for progressive candidates.
This trend, known as a spillover effect, garnered extra support at the polls for Democrat
Claire McCaskill, who won a Missouri Senate seat in 2006. Minimum wage worked as
other “hot-button” ballot questions have in the past. Initiatives such as gay marriage and
abortion have brought conservative voters to the polls. One such example was the 2004
Missouri ban on gay marriage, which passed 71 percent to 29 percent by attracting 1.5
million voters to the polls.149 In November 2006, many projected that the minimum wage
proposition, in addition to a ballot initiative supporting stem cell research, would increase
the number of progressives at the polls. As Oliver Griswold at the Ballot Initiative
Strategy Center said, “that kind of effort can really draw voters out to not only support
the minimum wage, but to support the candidates who support the minimum wage.”150
John Hickey of Missouri Progressive Vote Coalition, a coalition of unions and
community activist groups agreed, saying, “I think it’d be a reasonable assumption that
voters [motivated by the minimum wage initiative would] vote for McCaskill.”151 50
percent of Missourians voted for Claire McCaskill, 70 percent of whom were union
members, who likely voted to increase the minimum wage as well.152 Because the race
for Senator was very close, had minimum wage and stem cell research not been on the
ballot, it is probable that McCaskill would not have had the necessary support to beat her
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Republican opponent.

MEMBERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS: THE PROGRESSIVE PROPONENTS

Proposition B is the perfect example of direct democracy because a coalition of
citizens created and campaigned for its passage. The Missouri Progressive Vote
Coalition, also known as Pro-Vote, is a statewide coalition consisting of forty labor
unions and community groups. Missourians founded the group in 1992 “to give
grassroots organizations the tools to engage their membership in the public policy
process.”153 From March to May 2006, Jim Kottmeyer led the Missouri Progressive
Vote Coalition, which organized signature collection for a minimum wage increase in St.
Louis, Kansas City, Springfield, and Mid-Missouri. They later created a larger coalition,
Give Missourians a Raise, with faith groups, community organizations, and the unions
UAW, SEIU, AFL-CIO, and UNITE-HERE. Kottmeyer commented on how to create a
coalition: “You put together a convincing argument like putting a business together. You
have to find investors and partners.”154 The Missouri Progressive Vote Coalition
collected over 210,000 signatures to qualify Proposition B for the ballot, which is double
the number of necessary signatures.155
Although a progressive coalition created the initiative, Proposition B united citizens
across party lines. The minimum wage had not been raised since 1997 and so inflation,
gas prices, and a increased cost of living had worn away at bank accounts. As Bob
Soutier, secretary-treasurer of the ALF-CIO Greater St. Louis Labor Council said, “This
153
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is an issue of human dignity and common sense. We’re not a third world country.”156
Coalition member faith groups on both sides of the aisle agreed too. The conservative
Roman Catholic archbishop of St. Louis endorsed it, and progressive minister, Jack
Schuler said, “There are too many families in Missouri who are living in poverty,
struggling just to put food on the table. Raising the minimum wage will make a profound
difference in the lives of these families and our community as a whole.”157 Minimum
wage became an issue that could bring together Missourians for a common cause.
Give Missourians a Raise had a great deal of grassroots support, which they used to
attract voters on Election Day. The member unions, faith groups, and community groups
worked together to convince their members, friends, and neighbors to vote. Their
ultimate goal was to register 100,000 new voters. They also created strategy to pinpoint
“drop-off voters,” people who vote in Presidential cycles, but not in off years.158 The
organizations made themselves very visible, even holding a protest outside of Republican
Jim Talent’s fundraising event. He opposed a raise in the minimum wage and this protest
received a great deal of media coverage convincing voters not only to support his
opponent, Claire McCaskill, but also the minimum wage increase.159 This local
organizing worked well and Proposition B passed with overwhelming support.

MEMBERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS: OPPONENTS

The most vocal opponents of Proposition B were those who did not want to pay a
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higher minimum wage to workers; they formed a small coalition called Save Our State’s
Jobs. The member groups were small businesses and restaurants, but especially vocal in
the opposition campaign were the Missouri Restaurant Association and the Associated
Industries of Missouri. One such opponent was Mike Wiggins, owner of Continental
Catering and Granny Shaffer’s restaurants in Joplin and Webb City, and chairman of the
Missouri Restaurant Association, who noted that the restaurant industry was one of
twelve groups that contributed to the opposition.160 Many restaurant and small business
owners believed that if they had to increase wages for their employees and did not
decrease the number of workers, they would go bankrupt. Gary Marble of the Associated
Industries of Missouri said, “Would [low-wage workers want a raise] if they knew that
two to three of them wouldn’t have a job in three years, or that, in five years, potentially
the restaurant wouldn’t exist at all?”161 The businesses believed the only option would be
to eliminate jobs or close their doors.
However, the conservative coalition was not run at a grassroots level, as was Give
Missourians a Raise. In fact, they received much of their funding from out-of-state
organizations, especially from the National Restaurant Association. They also received a
great deal of support from national franchise restaurants that worried that a minimum
wage raise could lead to new national policy. Save Our State’s Jobs received such
support from McDonald’s, Applebee’s, and GMRI Inc. (Red Lobster, the Olive Garden,
and other restaurants). 162 It seems evident that it was this lack of local grassroots support
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that allowed for the passage of Proposition B. It would have been impossible for Save
Our States’ Jobs to defeat minimum wage without ground organizers to combat the Give
Missourians a Raise campaign’s powerful message.

GROUP MOBILIZATION: MESSAGE FORMATION

The progressive coalition message promoted an increased minimum wage by
highlighting the economic difficulties faced by low-wage workers in their state. Give
Missourians a Raise asserted that Missourians just could not survive and certainly could
not get ahead on the little money they made. The coalition formed and spread the
message that with inflation and a rising cost of living, low-wage workers were not
making enough money to survive. Jim Kottmeyer said that there really was not a need to
create a strong message because an increase in minimum wage appealed to most
Missourians, but that the campaign spread the message that “morally it was the right
thing to do to help some of the most distressed communities that the national government
ignored.”163 Hugh McVey, President of the AFL-CIO, confirmed this message, “If we are
truly going to value work and the workers who keep our economy going, we need to
reward that work with a wage that they can support their families on.” When speaking
with the media, coalition spokesperson Sarah Howard appealed to the traditional
American idea of the self-made man. She said, “the moral argument that, if you work
hard and you play by the rules, you ought to be able to support your family and hopefully
build a better life for your kids, I mean, that’s the American dream. That’s a community
value we all share.”164
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Influential economists gave strong support to the Proposition B coalition, by
arguing that a wage increase would not negatively affect the business community. The
Economic Policy Institute released a statement signed by 526 economists, including four
Nobel Prize winners and three past presidents of the American Economics Association,
which stated, “A modest increase in the minimum wage would improve the well-being of
low-wage workers and would not have the adverse effect that critics have claimed.”165
Furthermore, Princeton University economist Alan Krueger said that a price increase
would be unnoticeable to consumers and that a wage increase would lower employee
turnover. “If workers are paid more, they tend to have lower turnover. Turnover is costly
for employers, especially when they have to train new workers coming in, when they
have to search for workers. So the higher wages help to increase productivity in that
way.”166
Economists also promoted the idea that a minimum wage increase would create a
great deal of profit for Missouri. They believed that by raising the wage, businesses
would benefit from increased spending. The Missouri Budget Project added that the raise
in wage would create significant profit for the state due to taxable wages and sales tax on
items bought with higher wages. They estimated that the state tax revenue would
increase, experiencing an $85.5 million income growth per year. They estimated that
$21.4 million of earnings would be spent on Missouri goods.167 Ultimately, economists
offered great credibility to the progressive coalition message that not only workers, but
also business owners, would benefit from a wage increase. With the help of economists,
they were able to argue credibly that the state of Missouri would experience economic
165
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growth if voters approved Proposition B.
The conservative Save Our State’s Jobs coalition put their message in their political
action committee name. The message that they most strongly promoted was that if
minimum wage were raised, businesses would make less profit and would have to cut
jobs. As Restaurateur Forrest Miller said, “We have to keep the product cost in line with
what the customer’s willing to pay. When the customer says, ‘You’re charging me too
much,’ we do less business, we have less money to give people, and we have fewer
jobs.”168 The coalition underlined in nearly every media quotation that many low-wage
workers would quickly lose their jobs if Proposition B passed.
Save Our State’s Jobs also argued that in the face of a poor economy, a raised
minimum wage tied to inflation would cripple businesses. Some, such as John Mehner of
the Cape Giradeau Chamber of Commerce, argued that a ratchet effect, or “automatic
escalator clause” would continue to increase wages to an unaffordable point. “If a
company has bad years, which they do, [Proposition B] doesn't take that into account.
Those are unforgiving escalating costs that will end up taking away jobs.”169 The
coalition used of fear of an unstable market to try to prove the faults of Proposition B.

ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES: CAMPAIGN SPENDING

Spending in Missouri pales in comparison to the California and Maine initiatives.
Combined, the two Missouri campaigns spent $1,989,796 with Save Our State’s Jobs

168

The Online Newshour, “Missouri Debates Increasing Minimum Wage on November Ballot Initiative.”
Scott Moyers, “Proposition B asks voters to raise minimum wage in Missouri,” Southeast Missourian,
October 29, 2006, http://medialab.semissourian.com/story/1175185.html.
169

58
spending a mere $149,900 and Give Missourians a Raise spending $1,839,896.170 The
largest contributors to Give Missourians a Raise were labor unions that donated a total of
$705, 075.171 Nearly 95% of donors for the Save Our State’s Jobs coalition were in the
food and beverage sector, donating $144,700.172 Out of state funding is an especially
interesting element of the campaign spending for Proposition B. Both campaigns received
the majority of their contributions from out of state, with Save Our State’s Jobs receiving
$98,200 and Give Missourians a Raise receiving $1,356,400.173
Although some may see this strong fiscal support as a broad national interest in
the minimum wage issue, others believe that it was actually about winning a Democratic
majority in Congress. Some involved in the campaign say that they would not have
received similar fiscal support had Claire McCaskill not had a chance of defeating Jim
Talent. They believe that national unions only participated because it was in their
members’ interest to have a Democratic majority. One organizer, who wished to remain
anonymous, said that the only reason national organizations donated to the Give
Missourians a Raise campaign was to help Claire McCaskill win: “Why would a group
like the AFL-CIO get involved? Claire McCaskill. Every nickel spent was to win the U.S.
Senate majority.”174 This organizer posited that it is not always about the issue at hand,
but about larger political implications. In the coming years, we may see greater
contributions to ballot question campaigns as both political parties use spillover votes
170
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from ballot initiatives to candidates to win a precariously balanced Congress.
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CONCLUSION
In these case studies, I have offered varying perspectives of ballot question
campaigns. There is the story of Amy Thompson of the Maine People’s Alliance, who
stressed the importance of knocking on doors and speaking to your neighbors. Jim
Kottmeyer’s story is also important. He believed that Missourians needed a raise and took
the necessary action to place the measure on the ballot. What lessons can we learn from
the achievements of these coalitions?
In each case study we learn a different lesson about the necessity of coalitions and
grassroots support in ballot initiative campaigns. In Maine, national donors did not
support the anti-TABOR campaigners until the coalition of Citizens United rallied
enough in-state support to gain out-of-state attention. This tell-your-neighbor grassroots
organizing enabled the campaign ultimately to receive enough contributions to outspend
the pro-TABOR camp at a ratio of 5:1 and win the campaign. Proposition B, which also
promoted their message with a strong coalition of unions and community members won
by an overwhelming 76% of Missourians in support of the measure. The campaign
believes that the measure would not have passed if it had not been for the strong bonds
between the member organizations. It is clear that volunteers committed to grassroots
organizing can make a difference by speaking to their neighbors. Garnering this local
support can lead to large contributions from donors convinced of the likelihood of
success.
However Proposition 87 is a very different story, it is a story of failure that
includes neither a progressive coalition nor grassroots activity. It is important to
recognize that this campaign, although funded by some of the deepest pockets in
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Hollywood and investment banking, lacked citizen support. Although the list of
supporters for Proposition 87 included the California Federation of Teachers, the
California Labor Federation, the California League of Conservation Voters, there is little
evidence that these groups worked together to form any sort of grassroots campaign and
so Californians were not convinced that they should support Proposition 87.175 Perhaps
the California Nurses Association would have contributed their time to the campaign had
they not been supporting their own ballot measure, but it is unlikely that this would have
changed the outcome of the election, as the Yes on 87 campaign seemed not to encourage
any neighbor-to-neighbor campaigning, while No on 87 had local support of firefighters,
police officers, and teachers.
These three stories give credence to my belief that a coalition using grassroots
campaigning to spread its message is imperative to a progressive ballot question
campaign. I believe that without this early local backing, ballot questions will not gain
the necessary support to convince sympathetic citizens to vote. Of course, money is
necessary to win a ballot campaign, but campaigns will not receive these funds without
proof that they have the support of constituents. As with TABOR, many national groups
did not at first believe that the anti-TABOR campaign had a chance, even a few months
before Election Day. However, the amount of local support garnered by literature drops,
phone calls, and simple neighbor-to-neighbor discussions proved that the campaign had a
chance, which attracted national donors. Because the margin of victory was so small, if
groups such as the Maine People’s Alliance had not done this important work, the
election would have likely turned out starkly different results.
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Unions played an important fiscal role in both the TABOR and Proposition B
campaigns. Without their donations, neither campaign would have had the necessary
funding to win their campaign. This is especially true for the anti-TABOR campaign.
Due to the small margin of victory for the anti-TABOR campaign, the measure would
have passed if unions had not donated money to the opposition campaign. That said, I
believe that it is necessary for the Left to strongly consider options to aid unions and keep
jobs in our country. If outsourcing continues at the current rate, I predict that unions will
completely dissemble and progressive ballot campaigns will lose their main source of
funding. This would be disastrous for progressive activists and politicians.
To create a powerful progressive presence in this country, it is essential for
national and local organizations to support the work of progressive coalitions running
grassroots campaigns. Over the past fifteen years, the Right has enjoyed a strong voice
on the ballot, using hot-button issues not only to create policy, but to bring voters out
who will also support conservative officials. To maintain a Democratic Congress and to
promote a progressive legislative agenda, it is imperative for progressives to persevere
and work cooperatively. I would suggest a strong investment in the creation of long-term
coalitions that can learn from their mistakes, can create progressive legislation, and who
will be ready to fight and defeat conservative propositions at a moment’s notice. The
progressive community should take this moment of deep dissatisfaction with the Right to
build their base and attract voters to organizations that could become member groups of
coalitions. In this way, the Left could use progressive ballot measures to their advantage
to create the change they wish to see. As Amy Thompson of the Maine People’s Alliance
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said, “I believe it has a lot to do with grassroots organizing. That’s how you really change
people’s minds.”176
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Appendix 2
TABLE 1: IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CALIFORNIA, MISSOURI, AND MAINE CASES

Characteristics
Population177

California
36,457,549

Missouri
5,842,713

Maine
1,321,574

Population Rank178

1

17

40

Party Competition179

Competitive,
Leaning Democrat

Traditional
Democratic
Advantage

Competitive

Requirements to
Qualify an Initiative180

- No subject matter
restrictions
- Financial
Contributions
Reported
- 5% or 8% of votes
for governor in last
election needed for
statute and
amendment

- Restrictions on
subject matter
- Financial
Contributions
Reported
- 5% or 8% of
votes for governor
in last election
needed for statute
and amendment
and 5% or 8%
each from 2/3 of
congressional
districts for statute
and amendment

- No subject matter
restrictions
- Financial
Contributions
Reported
- 10% of votes for
governor in last
election needed for
statute and
amendment

Measures allowed in
mid-year elections?

No

No

Yes
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